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Abstract
We overview the main historical and technological elements characterising the
rise, the fall and the recent renaissance of the cognitive approaches to Artificial
Intelligence and provide some insights and suggestions about the future direc-
tions and challenges that, in our opinion, this discipline needs to face in the
next years.
Keywords: Cognitive Systems, Artificial Intelligence, Computational Models
of Cognition, Epistemology of the Artificial.
The scientific vision of the early Artificial Intelligence (AI) can be success-
fully synthesized by the words of Pat Langley: “AI aimed at understanding and
reproducing in computational systems the full range of intelligent behaviour
observed by humans” (Langley, 2012). This approach, known as the ‘cog-
nitivist’ approach to AI according to the terminological distinction provided5
by Vernon (Vernon, 2014), borrowed its original inspiration –from a historical
perspective– from the methodological approach developed by scholars in Cyber-
netics (Cordeschi, 1991). In this perspective, the computational simulation of
biological processes was assumed to play a central epistemological role in the
development and refinement of theories about the elements characterizing the10
nature of intelligent behaviour in natural and artificial systems. As a conse-
quence, it was also crucial for the development of artificial solutions inspired by
human processes and heuristics (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999).
Likewise, thanks to the computational approach to Cognitive Science, in-
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telligent systems based on computational models and architectures of cognition15
have been also proposed with the aim at providing a deeper understanding of
human thinking, as originally suggested in the manifesto of the Information
Processing Psychology (IPP) (Newell & Simon, 1972).
After the first decades of pioneering collaborations, however, starting from
the mid 80’s of the last Century, Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science20
have started to produce several sub-fields, each with its own goals, methods and
evaluation criteria. On the one hand this fragmentation led AI to reach remark-
able results in a variety of specific fields by focussing on quantitative results and
metrics of performance, and on a machine-oriented approach to the intelligent
behaviour (i.e., without taking into account human-inspired heuristics). On25
the other hand, however, it has significantly inhibited the cross-field collabora-
tions and the research efforts targeted at investigating a more general picture
of what natural and artificial intelligence is, and how intelligent artifacts can
be designed by taking into account the insights coming from human cognition.
Nowadays, in fact, artificial systems endowed with human-like and human-level30
intelligence (McCarthy, 2007) are still far from being achieved. Given this state
of affairs, in the last few years the cognitive approach to AI gained a renewed
consideration, both from academia and industry, in wide research areas such as
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, Robotics, Machine Learning, Bio-
Inspired Cognitive Computing, Computational Creativity and further research35
fields that aspire to Human Level Intelligence (also called AGI, Artificial General
Intelligence) in designing computational artifacts.
The AIC workshop series on Artificial Intelligence and Cognition1 (most
works in the current Special Issue are selected and extended versions of the
papers presented therein), played, in this perspective, a recognized role of pro-40
motion and development of this movement, at least in Europe (Lieto & Cruciani,
2013; Lieto et al., 2014; Lieto & Cruciani, 2015; Lieto & Radicioni, 2015).
This sort of ‘cognitive renaissance’ of AI, essentially, still considers the “cog-
1 http://dblp.uni-trier.de/db/conf/aic/
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nition in the loop” approach as a useful one to detect and unveil novel and
hidden aspects of the cognitive theories by building properly designed compu-45
tational models of cognition useful to progress towards a deeper understanding
of the foundational roots of intelligence (both in natural and artificial systems).
An important methodological aspect to consider within this framework regards
the explanatory role played by such artificial models (and systems) with respect
to the target natural cognitive systems they take as source of inspiration. In50
particular, models and systems based on the methodological approach known
as functionalism2 and, therefore, purely based on a weak equivalence (i.e. the
equivalence in terms of functional organization) between cognitive processes and
AI procedures are not good candidates for providing advances in the science of
cognitive AI (and this is the case, for example, of technologies like IBM Wat-55
son. In this case, in fact, the adoption of the expression “cognitive system”
represents a misuse). On the other hand, since it is currently not possible to
reproduce a realistic strong equivalence between a computational model/system
and a target natural system (such as human cognition),3 the only way to make
progress is based on the development of plausible structural models of our cog-60
nition based on a more constrained equivalence between AI procedures and their
corresponding cognitive processes. Only models and systems based on the de-
sign constraints proposed by the “structural” approach4 can be considered good
2Functionalism was introduced in the philosophy of mind by Putnam in his seminal article
entitled Minds and Machines (Putnam, 1960). In its more radical formulation it postulates
the sufficiency, from an epistemological perspective, of a weak equivalence between cognitive
processes and AI procedures and propose that, from an explanatory point of view, the rela-
tion between “natural mind” and “artificial software” can be based purely on a macroscopic
equivalence of the functional organization of the two systems. This position has been widely
criticized in the literature in the last decades (also by Putnam himself).
3This phenomenon is known as the “Wiener paradox”, and can be summarized through
Wiener’s own words about the fact that “the best material model of a cat is another or possibly
the same cat” (Rosenblueth & Wiener, 1945). In short, this “paradox” advocates for the need
of the realization of proxy-models, not replicas, of a given natural system by pointing out the
difficulty of such challenge.
4Differently from the functionalism, the structural approach claims for the epistemological
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“proxyies” of a the target cognitive system taken as inspiration, and can play
an explanatory role about it (Cordeschi, 2002; Mi lkowski, 2013).65
According to such approach, these kinds of models and systems can be useful
both to advance the science of AI in terms of technological achievements (e.g.
in tasks that are easily solvable for humans but very hard to solve for machines,
such as - for example - in common sense reasoning) and to play the role of “com-
putational experiments”, able to provide insights and results useful in refining70
or rethinking theoretical aspects concerning the target biological system used
as source of inspiration. This perspective –along with the many challenges it
forces us to accept– represents the pillar of this Special Issue and, at different
levels of granularity, the papers selected in this issue illustrate systems that can
be ascribed to this approach of cognitive AI.75
Under a historical perspective, this Special Issue also appears in a very
important occasion since in 2016 falls the 60th anniversary of the Dartmouth
Conference, the event which actually inaugurated the history of Artificial Intelli-
gence (AI) and Cognitive Systems research. As mentioned, many of the pioneers
who settled AI as a research discipline shared the dream of (re-)creating high-80
level intelligence through computational means, i.e., achieving human-level AI
by taking inspiration from the heuristics of the human cognition. This goal is
still being pursued (although with varied interpretations) by many researchers
all around the world, and it still represents one of the main challenges for the
AIC community.85
In the following we provide a quick tour on the works appearing in the Spe-
cial Issue. The article What is ‘Wrong’ in a Neural Model by Alessio Plebe
presents a biologically plausible neurocomputational model of moral behaviour;
such a model is implemented in a neural network that combines reinforcement
and Hebbian learning. The model is used to simulate the interaction of the sen-90
sorial system with emotional and decision making systems in situations involving
need of artificial models whose ”functions” are designed and implemented by considering the
same “structures” (i.e. the same biological and cognitive “constraints”) of human cognition.
4
  
moral judgments. The article Object Replacement and Object Composition in
a Creative Cognitive System. Towards a Computational Solver of the Alter-
native Uses Test by Ana-Maria Olteteanu & Zoe Falomir proposes a creative
approach to problem solving defined through a cognitive architecture where a95
goal can be reached by replacing a missing object with another one with similar
affordance; alternatively, a suitable object can be composed with other ones
that are present in the environment. The work Hierarchies of Self-Organizing
Maps for Action Recognition by Haris Dindo, Miriam Buonamente and Magnus
Johnsson presents a hierarchical neural architecture, based on Self-Organizing100
Maps (SOMs), designed to recognize observed human actions. The article Image
Schemas in Computational Conceptual Blending by Maria M. Hedblom, Oliver
Kutz and Fabian Neuhaus is an investigation on the role of image schemas in
the concept creation process; it also shows how this approach has led to the de-
velopment of a library of formalized image schemas that provide heuristics for105
the computational blending of concepts. The work Multilayer Cognitive Archi-
tecture for UAV Control by Stanislav Emel’yanov, Dmitry Makarov, Aleksandr
I. Panov and Konstantin Yakovlev presents an architecture designed for dealing
with control problems in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles. The proposed
architecture includes a three-layered structure, including a strategic level (ac-110
counting for high-level cognitive tasks, such as planning, prioritizing tasks), a
tactical level (concerned with navigation activities) and a reactive level (in-
tended to generate various sorts of control signals).
We are indebted to the referees of this special issue that helped us in the
selection process. We thank: Agnese Augello, Cristina Bosco, Eduardo Datteri,115
Marcello Frixione, Anna Jordanous, Othalia Larue, Alessandro Oltramari, Vi-
viana Patti, Alessio Plebe, Viola Schiaffonati, Sara Tonelli and Fabio Massimo
Zanzotto.
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